The Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu (Case No. ICTR-96-4-T)
Rwanda, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

The Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu (Case No. ICTR-96-4-T)

DATE 02-09-1998DOWNLOAD LEGAL DECISION

Judges:

Laïty Kama

Laïty Kama

Lennart Aspegren

Lennart Aspegren

Navanethem Pillay

Navanethem Pillay

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Topics:

International Gender Crimes

Related standards:

Statute of the International Court for Rwanda Article 1: Competence of the International Tribunal for Rwanda

RELATED STANDARDS

Statute of the International Court for Rwanda Article 1: Competence of the International Tribunal for Rwanda

The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.
Statute of the International Court for Rwanda Article 3: Crimes against Humanity

RELATED STANDARDS

Statute of the International Court for Rwanda Article 3: Crimes against Humanity

The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation; (e) Imprisonment; (f) Torture; (g) Rape; (h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) Other inhumane acts.
Statute of the International Court for Rwanda Article 2: Genocide

RELATED STANDARDS

Statute of the International Court for Rwanda Article 2: Genocide

1. The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article or of committing any of the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this Article. 2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 3. The following acts shall be punishable: (a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide.
Statute of the International Court for Rwanda Article 4: Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II

RELATED STANDARDS

Statute of the International Court for Rwanda Article 4: Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II

The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977. These violations shall include, but shall not be limited to: (a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; (b) Collective punishments; (c) Taking of hostages; (d) Acts of terrorism; (e) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; (f) Pillage; (g) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilised peoples; (h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
Statute of the International Court for Rwanda Article 6: Individual Criminal Responsibility

RELATED STANDARDS

Statute of the International Court for Rwanda Article 6: Individual Criminal Responsibility

1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime. 2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of state or government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment. 3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a government or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal for Rwanda determines that justice so requires.
Statute of the International Court for Rwanda Article 8: Concurrent Jurisdiction

RELATED STANDARDS

Statute of the International Court for Rwanda Article 8: Concurrent Jurisdiction

1. The International Tribunal for Rwanda and national courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens for such violations committed in the territory of the neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. 2. The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the primacy over the national courts of all States. At any stage of the procedure, the International Tribunal for Rwanda may formally request national courts to defer to its competence in accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.

WHY IT MATTERS:

The decisions of the Trial Chamber of the ICTR may be appealed to the Appeals Chamber. In 2001, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber’s judgment in the Akayesu case.

This judgment sets an important precedent for the prosecution and punishment of gender-based crimes, whether committed in peacetime or wartime. It recognizes that rape and sexual violence always constitute torture, and may also constitute crimes against humanity or genocide, depending on the context and whether the other elements of these crimes are present. With this finding, the ICTR abandoned the traditional notion of rape as a crime against male honor or the family.

Furthermore, the judgment offers new definitions of rape and sexual violence that are not limited to mere mechanical descriptions of objects and body parts. These definitions have been influential not only in international law, but also in domestic jurisdictions and legislation, marking an important step forward in the defense of women’s human rights.

The judgment in the Akayesu case was a key factor in the inclusion of gender-based crimes, including rape and sexual violence, in the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has jurisdiction over crimes of genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwandan territory between January 1 and December 31, 1994. In this case, the Tribunal heard charges brought against Jean Paul Akayesu, bourgmestre of Taba commune during this period. In Rwanda, the bourgmestre is the highest authority in a commune. While the town was under the defendant’s administration, around 2,000 persons belonging to the Tutsi ethnic group were murdered and hundreds of women were beaten, raped, and subjected to other forms of sexual violence. The Tribunal found that Akayesu facilitated, encouraged, and ordered the commission of these acts. He was found criminally responsible for genocide and crimes against humanity. 

In its judgment, the Tribunal found that the rape and sexual violence committed against Tutsi women constituted acts of genocide, torture, and torture as a crimes against humanity.
At the time the events occurred, Rwanda was divided administratively into prefectures, which in turn were divided into communes. Each commune was administrated by a bourgmestre, the highest authority in the commune, charged with maintaining law and order. The bourgmestre was in charge of the municipal police and responsible for law enforcement and the administration of justice.   
Because of the extreme violence of the conflict, hundreds of civilians sought refuge in communal government buildings. Most of these displaced civilians were Tutsi women and children. While in hiding, the women were regularly attacked and subjected to sexual violence, beatings, and death threats from soldiers and municipal police, often by multiple attackers. The women lived in constant fear and their physical and psychological health deteriorated as a result. 

The prosecution alleged that defendant Jean Paul Akayesu, as bourgmestre and the highest local authority in Taba, knew or had reason to know that these crimes were being committed, and despite having the authority and the responsibility to do so, never took steps to prevent them or called for assistance from regional or national authorities to quell the violence. 

The prosecutor filed charges against Akayesu before the ICTR on February 13, 1996. The indictment was confirmed on February 16 of the same year. It included 15 charges for genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 2.
Individual Criminal Responsibility

The Tribunal found that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that the soldiers who were directly responsible for the commission of crimes were the defendant’s subordinates. It did not therefore find him criminally responsible as a superior officer, but it did find that he had reason to know that murders and acts of sexual violence were being committed and that he aided and abetted in their commission by allowing them to take place on or near the premises of the Bureau Communal. By virtue of his position of authority, his encouragement sent a clear signal of official tolerance for sexual violence, without which these acts could not have taken place.

Rape and Sexual Violence as Genocide


The Tribunal opined that rape and sexual violence constitute acts of genocide when they are committed with the specific intent of destroying, in whole or in part, a particular group, as such. In light of all the evidence presented, the Tribunal found that the acts of rape and sexual violence “were committed solely against Tutsi women, many of whom were subjected to the worst public humiliation, mutilated, and raped several times, often in public, in the Bureau Communal premises or in other public places, and often by more than one assailant. These rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole.” The Tribunal went on to note that “As part of the propaganda campaign geared to mobilizing the Hutu against the Tutsi, the Tutsi women were presented as sexual objects.... This sexualized representation of ethnic identity graphically illustrates that Tutsi women were subjected to sexual violence because they were Tutsi. Sexual violence was a step in the process of destruction of the Tutsi group - destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself.”

Rape and Sexual Violence as Torture and as a Crime against Humanity


The Chamber defined rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.” It defined sexual violence, which includes rape, as “any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.” The judgment notes that “rape is a form of aggression and that the central elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts. 

The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment does not catalogue specific acts in its definition of torture, focusing rather on the conceptual frame work of state sanctioned violence. (...) Like torture, rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a person. Like torture, rape is a violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” The Chamber went on to indicate that sexual violence “is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact.” The Tribunal clarified that “coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force. 

Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed conflict.” Furthermore, rape and sexual violence constitute crimes against humanity when they are committed as part of a systematic and widespread attack on a civilian population carried out on discriminatory grounds such as nationality, ethnic group, race, religion, or political ideas. Finally, the judgment indicated that sexual violence falls within the categories of “other inhumane acts,” “outrages upon personal dignity,” and “serious physical or mental suffering.”

The Tribunal unanimously found the defendant guilty of genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and the crimes against humanity of extermination, murder, torture, rape, and other inhumane acts. It found him not guilty of a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Article 4(2)(e) of Additional Protocol II. 

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